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Abstract
This paper presents the first hierarchical Byzantine tolerant replication architecture suitable 10
to systems that span

multiple wide area sites.
sites. The architecture confines the effects of any malicious replica to its local site,
site. reduces
message complexity of wide area communication, and allows read-only queries to be performed
perfo~medlocally within a
site for the price of additional hardware. A prototype implementation is evaluated over several network topologies
and is compared with a flat
flat Byzantine tolerant approach.
approach.
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I. INTRODUCTION

During the last few years, there has been considerable progress in the design of Byzantine tolerant replication
systems.
systems. The current state of the art protocols perform very well on small-scale systems that are usually confined to
local area networks. However, current solutions employ flat architectures that introduce several limitations:
limitations: Message
complexity limits their ability to scale, and strong connectivity requirements limit their availability on wide area

networks that usually have lower bandwidth, higher latencies, and exhibit network partitions.
This paper presents Steward,
Steward, the first hierarchical Byzantine tolerant replication architecture suitable for systems

that span multiple wide area sites, each consisting of several server replicas. Steward assumes no trusted component
in the entire system, other than a valid mechanism to pre-distribute private/public
keys.
privatelpublic keys.
Steward uses a Byzantine tolerant protocol within each site and a lightweight, benign fault tolerant protocol
among wide area sites.
sites. Each site, consisting of several potentially malicious replicas, is converted into a single

logical trusted participant in the wide area fault-tolerant protocol. Servers within a site run a Byzantine agreement
protocol to order operations locally, and agree upon the content of any message leaving
Ieavinz the site for the global
protocol.
Guaranteeing a consistent agreement within a site is not enough. The protocol needs to eliminate the ability of

malicious replicas to misrepresent decisions that took place in their site. To that end, messages between servers
at different sites carry a threshold signature attesting that enough servers at the originating site agreed with the
content of the message. Using threshold signatures allows Steward to save the space and computation associated

with sending and verifying multiple individual signatures. Moreover, it allows for a practical key management
scheme where servers need to know only a single public key for each remote site and not the individual public
keys of all remote servers.
The main benefits of our architecture are:
are:
I)
N 2 (N being the total number of replicas
1) It reduces the message complexity on wide area exchanges from N~
in the system) to 52
S* (S being the number of wide area sites), considerably increasing the system's ability to
scale.
scale.
2) It confines the effects of any malicious replica to its local site, enabling the use of a benign fault-tolerant
fault-tolerant

algorithm over the wide area network. This improves the availability of the system over wide area networks
that are prone to partitions, as only a majority of connected sites is needed to make progress, compared with

2f
at least 21

+ 11 servers (out

3f
of 31

1) in
+ 1)

flat Byzantine architectures.

site, enabling the system to continue serving
3) It allows read-only queries to be performed locally within a site,
read-only requests even in sites that are partitioned.
4) It enables a practical key management scheme where public keys of specific replicas need to be known only
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within their own site.
site.
These benefits come with a price. If the requirement is to protect against any f Byzantine servers in the system,
Steward requires 31
3f

+ 11 servers in

each site. However,
However, in return, it is able to overcome up to 1
f malicious servers

in each site.
site.
Steward further optimizes the above approach based on the observation that not aJJ
all messages associated with the
wide area fault-tolerant protocol require a complete Byzantine ordering agreement in the local site.
site. A considerable
amount of these wide area messages require a much lighter local site step, reducing the communication and
computation cost on the critical path.
The paper demonstrates that the performance of Steward with 3f

+ 11 servers in

each site is much better even

+

compared with a flat Byzantine architecture with a smaJJer
3f + 1 total servers spread over the same wide
smaller system of 3f
area topology.
topology. The paper further demonstrates that Steward
Steward exhibits performance comparable (though somewhat
lower) with common benign fault-tolerant protocols on wide area networks.
The Steward system is completelY
completely implemented and is currently undergoing a DARPA red-team experiment to
assess its practical survivability in the face
face of white-box attacks (where
(where the red team has complete knowledge of
system design,
design, access to its source code, and control of up to f replicas in each site).
site). We hope to be able to report
on the insight gained from this activity in a final
final version of this paper.
The remainder of the paper is presented as foJJows.
follows. We provide a more detailed problem statement in Section II.
11.
We present our assumptions and the service.
service model in Section III.
111. We describe our protocol, Steward, and provide
a sketch for a proof
proof that it meets the specified
specified safety and liveness properties,
properties. in Sections IV and V. We present
experimental results demonstrating the improved scalability of Steward on wide area networks in Section VI. We
discuss previous work in several
several related research areas in Section VII. We summarize our conclusions in Section

VIII.

II.

BACKGROUND

Our work requires concepts from fault tolerance, Byzantine fault tolerance and threshold cryptography. To
protocol, Steward,
facilitate the presentation of our protocol,
Steward, we first
first provide an overview
overview of three representative works
in these areas:
areas: Paxos,
Paxos, BFT and RSA Threshold Signatures.
Si,unatures.
Paxos:
Paxos: Paxos [l],
[I], [2]
[2] is a well-known fault-tolerant protocol that aJJows
allows a set of distributed servers, exchanging
messages via asynchronous
totaJJy order client requests in the benign-fault, crash-recovery model.
model.
asynchronous communication,
communication, to totally

server, referred to as the leader,
leader, has the task of coordinating the protocol. If
If the leader crashes or becomes
One server,

+

unreachable, a new leader is elected.
elected. Paxos requires at least 2f
2f + 11 servers to tolerate ff faulty servers. Since servers
are not Byzantine, only one reply needs to be delivered to the client.
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In the common case,
case, in which a single leader exists and can communicate with a majority of servers,
servers, Paxos uses

two asynchronous communication rounds to globally order client updates. In the first round, Proposal, the leader
assigns a sequence number to a client update, and proposes this assignment to the rest of the servers. In the second
round, Accept, any server receiving the proposal assents to the assigned sequence number,
number, or accepts the proposal,

by sending an acknowledgment to the rest of the servers.
servers. When a server receives a majority of acknowledgments
-- indicating that a majority of servers have accepted the proposal -- the server orders the corresponding update.
If the leader crashes or is partitioned away,
protocol to replace the old leader,
away, the servers run a leader election
electio~zprotocol
leader,
allowing progress to resume. The leader election protocol follows
follows a similar two-round, proposal-accept pattern,
where the value proposed will be a new leader.
leader. The protocol associates a unique view number with the reign of a
leader (i.e. view) and defines a one-to-one
one-to-one mapping between the view number and the identifier of the server acting
as the leader in this view.
view. The system proceeds through a series of views, with a view change occurring
occumng each time
a new leader is elected.
elected. Proposals are thus made in the context of a given view.
view.
BFT: The BFT [3]
[3] protocol addresses the problem of replication in the Byzantine model where a number of
of
the servers can be compromised and exhibit arbitrary behavior.
behavior. Similar to Paxos, BFT uses an elected leader to
views. BFT extends Paxos into the Byzantine environment
coordinate the protocol, and proceeds through a series of views.

by using an additional round of communication in the common case to ensure consistency both in and across
views, and by constructing strong majorities in each round of the protocol. Specifically,
Specifically, BFT requires end-to-end
acknowledgments from 2f
Zf
wait for f

+ lout
1 out of 3f
3f + 11 servers to mask the behavior of f Byzantine servers. A client must

+ 11 identical responses to be guaranteed that at least one correct server assented to the returned value.
value.

In the common case, BFT uses three communication rounds: Pre-Prepare, Prepare and Commit.
Commit. In the first
first

round, the leader assigns a sequence number to a client update and proposes this assignment to the rest of the
servers by multicasting a pre-prepare message to all servers.
servers. In the second round,
round, a server accepts the proposed
assignment by sending an acknowledgment, prepare, to all servers. The first two communication rounds guarantee

that correct servers agree on a total order of the updates proposed within the same view.
view. When a server receives
2f

+
prepare messages with the same view number and sequence number as the pre-prepare, it begins the third
+ 11 prepare

Commit, by multicasting a commit
cornr~iitmessage to all servers. A server commits
coinrnits the corresponding update when
round, Commit,

+

it receives 2f
2 f + 1 matching commit
conirnit messages. The third communication round, in combination with the view change

protocol, ensures the total ordering of updates across views.
views.

Threshold digital signatures: Threshold cryptography [4]
[4] distributes
distributes trust among a group of participants to
protect information
information (e.g.
(e.g. threshold secret sharing [5])
[ 5 ] )or computation (e.g.
(e.g. threshold digital signatures [6]).
[6]). Threshold
define a threshold parameter, k,
k , such that any set of at least k (out of n) participants can work together
schemes define
to perform a desired task (such as computing a digital signature), while any subset of fewer than k participants
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is unable to do so. In this way, threshold cryptography offers a tunable degree of fault-tolerance: in the benign
fault model, the system can function despite (n-k) faults,
faults, and in the Byzantine fault model, an adversary must
corrupt k participants to break the system.
system. In particular, corrupting fewer than k participants yields no useful
information. There is a natural connection between Byzantine fault-tolerance and threshold cryptography, since
both distribute trust among participants and make assumptions about the number of honest participants required in
order to guarantee correctness.
A (k,
(k, n) threshold digital signature scheme allows a set of n servers
servers to generate a digital signature as a single
logical entity despite J
f == (k
( k -- 1)
1) Byzantine faults.
faults. In a (k,
(k, n) threshold digital signature scheme, a private key
is divided into n partial shares,
shares, each owned by a server, such that any set of k servers can pool their shares to
generate
renerate a valid threshold signature, while any set of fewer than k servers is unable to do so.
so. To sign a message
G

m,
m, each server uses its share to generate a partial signature on m, and sends the partial signature to a combiner

server.
server. The combiner combines the partial signatures into a threshold signature on m. The threshold signature is
verified in the standard way, using the public key corresponding to the divided private key. Shares can be changed

proactively [7],
[7], [8]
[8] without changing the public key, allowing for increased security and fault-tolerance, since an
adversary must compromise k partial shares within a certain time window to break the system.
Since the participants can be malicious, it is important to be able to verify that the partial signature provided by
any participant is valid -- that is, it was generated with a share from the initial key split.
split. This property, known as
verifiable secret sharing [9],
[9], guarantees the robustness [10]
[ l o ] of the threshold signature generation.
A representative example of practical threshold digital signature schemes is the RSA Shoup
[6] scheme, which
Shoup [6]
allows participants to generate threshold signatures
signatures based on the standard RSA[11] digital signature. The scheme
defines a (k, n) RSA threshold signature scheme, and provides verifiable secret sharing. The computational overhead
of verifying that the partial signatures were generated using correct shares is significant.
significant. The resulting threshold
signature can be non-interactively verified using the same technique as the standard RSA signature.

III.
111. SYSTEM
SYSTEMMODEL
MODELAND
A N D SERVICE
SERVICEGUARANTEES
GUARANTEES
In our model, servers are implemented as deterministic state machines. All correct servers begin in the same
initial state, and transition between the states by applying updates as they are ordered.
ordered. The next state is completely
determined by the current state and the next update to be applied.
We assume a Byzantine fault model. Servers are classified as either correct or faulty. Correct servers do not
crash. Faulty servers may behave in an arbitrary manner, and may: exhibit two-faced behavior, fail to send messages,

servers, etc.
collude with other faulty servers,
Communication is asynchronous.
asynchronous. Messages can be delayed, lost, or duplicated. Messages that do arrive are not

corrupted.
corrupted.
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Servers
Servers are
are organized into wide area sites.
sites. Each site has a unique identifier. Each server belongs to exactly one
site.
site. The
The network may partition into multiple disjoint components,
components, each containing one or more sites. During a
partition,
partition, servers
servers from
from sites
sites in different components are unable to communicate with each other. Components may

+

subsequently
of servers
subsequently re-merge.
re-merge. Each site
site Si
Si has at least 3 * (Ii)
( f i ) + 11 servers, where fIii is the maximum number of
that may be faulty
faulty within Si.
Si. For simplicity, we assume in what follows that all sites may have fI faulty servers.
Clients
Clients are
are distinguished by unique identifiers. Clients send updates to servers within their local site and receive
responses from
of the identifier
identifier of
of the client that
from these servers.
servers. Each update is uniquely identified by a pair consisting of
generated the
the update and
and a unique,
unique, monotonically increasing logical timestamp. Clients propose updates sequentially:

+

aa client may propose an update with timestamp i + 11 only after it receives a reply for an update with timestamp i.
We
We employ digital
digital signatures,
signatures, and we make use of a cryptographic hash function to compute message digests.
Client
Client updates are
are properly authenticated and protected against modifications. We assume that all adversaries,
including faulty
faulty servers, are
are computationally bounded such that they cannot subvert these cryptographic mechanisms.
We
We also
also use a (k,
(k, n)
n) threshold digital signature scheme.
scheme. Each site has a public key, and each server receives a
share
proof can be
share with
with the corresponding proof. The share can be used to generate a partial signature, and the proof
used to
threshold
to generate a verification proof
proof that the partial signature was computed using a valid share. A valid threshold
signature
signature representing the site
site is computed by using k partial signatures. We assume that the threshold scheme
guarantees
guarantees that threshold signatures are unforgeable without knowing k or more secret shares.
Our protocol assigns
assigns global,
global, monotonically increasing sequence numbers to updates to establish a global, total

order. Below we define
define the safety and liveness properties of the Steward protocol. We say that:
order.
• a client proposes an update when the client sends the update to a server in the local site.

sewer initiates an update when, upon receiving the update from a client, the server forwards the update for
• a server

global ordering.
ordering.
global
sewer executes an update with sequence ii when it applies the update to its state machine. A server executes
• a server
update i only after having executed all updates with a lower sequence in the global total order.

• a site executes an update when some correct server in the site executes the update.
h - 0 servers within a site are connected if they can communicate with no communication failures.
• fYvo

two sites are connected if every correct server of each site can communicate with every correct server of
• fWo
of the

site with no communication failures.
failures.
other site
D E F ~ N ~ T 3.1:
~3.1:
O NSS11 - SAFETY:
SAFETY:If two correct servers execute the ith
DEFINITION
i th update, then these updates are identical.
DEFINIT~O
3.2:
N S2
S2 - VALJDlTY:
VALIDITY:Only an update that was proposed by a client (and subsequently
DEFINlTlON
3.2:
subsequently initiated by
server) may
may be executed.
aa server)
DEFINITION
3.3: GLJ
GLI - GLOBAL
GLOBALPROGRESS:
PROGRESS:If there exists a set of
DEFINITION
3.3:
of a majority of
of sites, each consisting of
of at
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least
least

21
2f + 11 correct,
correct, connected servers,
servers, and

a time after which all sites in the set are connected, then if
if a client

connected
connected to
to aa site in the set proposes an update,
update, some site in the set eventually executes the update.
DESCRIPTION
IV.
IV. PROTOCOL
PROTOCOL
DESCRIPTION
Steward
Steward leverages
leverages a hierarchical architecture to scale Byzantine replication to the high-latency, low-bandwidth
links
links characteristic of wide area
area networks. It employs more costly Byzantine fault-tolerant protocols within a site,
confining
confining Byzantine behavior to a site
site and allowing a more lightweight, fault-tolerant protocol to be run among
sites.
sites. This
This results
results in fewer messages and communication rounds on the wide area compared to a flat Byzantine
solution.
solution. The
The price is
is the need to have enough hardware within a site to overcome

1
f malicious servers.

A
A site
site is
is made to behave as
as a single logical participant in the wide area fault-tolerant protocol through a
combination of Byzantine agreement and threshold digital
digital signatures. The servers within a site agree upon the
content of any
any message leaving
leaving the site,
site, and then construct a threshold signature on the message to prevent a
malicious server from
from misrepresenting the site.
site. One server in each site, referred to as the representative, coordinates
the
of one site, referred to as
the internal
internal agreement and threshold signing protocols within the site. The representative of
the
of a site acts maliciously, the
the leading
leading site,
site, coordinates the wide area agreement protocol. If the representative of
servers
servers of that
that site
site will elect a new representative. If the leading site is partitioned away, the servers in the other
sites
sites will
will elect a new leading site.
site.
At aa higher level,
level, Steward
Steward uses a wide area Paxos-like algorithm to globally order updates. However, the entities
participating in our protocol
protocol are
are not single trusted participants like iinn Paxos. Each site entity in our wide area

is composed of a set of potentially malicious servers. Steward employs several intra-site protocols as
protocol is
building blocks at
of the wide area algorithm steps, based
at each site,
site, to emulate a correct Paxos participant in each of
on
on need.
need. For example,
example, the leader participant in Paxos unilaterally assigns a unique sequence number to an update.

Instead, Steward
Steward uses an
an intra-site protocol that employs a BFT-like mechanism to assign a global sequence number
Instead,
number
in agreement with the servers
servers inside the leading site. The leading site will need to present to other sites a proof
in
proof that
the sequence
sequence indeed was assigned.
assigned. Steward
Steward uses a different intra-site protocol to threshold-sign the Paxos proposal
the
message demonstrating that

+ 11 correct servers in the leading site agreed to that global sequence number. The
1f +

same threshold
threshold signature intra-site protocol is used to issue Paxos-like acknowledgments in non-leader sites.
same
In addition,
addition, Steward
Steward uses intra-site protocols that serve for Byzantine election of
of the new represeiztative
representative inside
In
each site,
site, as
as well
well as
as for
for proposing a new leading site.
each
The intra-site protocols used by Steward
Steward are as follows:
follows:
The

.

+

THRESHOLD-SIGN: this protocol signs a message with a threshold signature composed of
f + 1 shares, within
• THRESHOLD-SIGN:
of 221
site. After executing this protocol, every correct process has a message that was signed with a threshold
aa site.

+

2f + 11 shares.
signature composed of 21
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• ASSIGN-SEQUENCE:
ASSIGN-SEQUENCE:

this protocol assigns a sequence number to an update received within a site, in the case

when the representative is not suspected,
suspected, and no internal view change takes place. It is invoked at the leading

+

site
sire to assign a unique sequence number to an update such that at least f + 11 correct servers will agree on the
sequence number.
number.
• PROPOSE-LEADER-SITE:
PROPOSE-LEADER-SITE:

this protocol is used to generate an agreement inside a site regarding which wide

area site should be the next leading site in the global ordering protocol.

CONSTRUCT-COLLECTIVE-STATE: this
• CONSTRUCT-COLLECTIVE-STATE:

protocol provides reconciliation during a view change and generates a

+

message describing the current state of the site, as agreed by at least f + 11 correct servers inside the site.
site.
Below we provide a short description of the common case of operation of Steward,
Steward, the view changes algorithms,
the timers used by our protocols, and the inter-dependency between the global protocol and intra-site timeouts. A
complete pseudocode of all protocols used by Steward can be found in [12].
[12].

A. The
Tlze Common
Co~nmonCase

During the common case,
case, global progress is made and no leading site or site representative election occurs. The
common case works as follows:
follows:
1)
1) A client located at some site sends an update to a server in its local site.
site. This server forwards
forwards the update to
the local representative.
represenrative.
2)
2 ) The local representative forwards
forwards the update to the representative of the leading site.
3) The representative of the leading site initiates a Byzantine agreement protocol within the site to assign a
global sequence number to the update;
proposal message. The site then
update; this assignment is encapsulated in a proposal
generates a threshold digital signature on the constructed proposal, and the representative sends the signed
proposal to all other sites for global ordering.
ordering.
4) Upon receiving a signed proposal, the representative of each site initiates the process of generating a site
acknowledgment (accept),
(accept), and then sends the acknowledgment signed with a threshold signature to the
representative of all other sites.
sites.
5) The representative of each site forwards
forwards the incoming accept messages to all local servers. A server globally
orders the update when it receives signed accepts from a majority of sites. The server at the client's local
site that originally received the update sends a reply back to the client.
6) If the client does not receive a reply to its update within a certain amount of time, it resends the update, this
time broadcasting it to all servers at its site.

All site-originated messages that are sent as part of the fault-tolerant global protocol, require threshold digital
signatures so that they may be trusted by other sites.
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The THRESHOLD-SIGN
1, 3f+
I) threshold signature on a given message. As
THRESHOLD-SIGN intra-site protocol generates a (2f+
(2f+l,
3f+l)
described in Section II,
11, each server is assumed to have a partial share and a proof that the share was obtained from
the initial secret (i.e.
(i.e. private key).
key). Upon invoking
invoking the protocol on a message to be signed,
signed, the server generates a
partial signature on this message. In addition, the server constructs a verification proof that can be used to confirm
that the partial signature was indeed created using a valid share. Both the partial signature and the verification proof
are sent to all servers within the site.

Upon receiving 2f+
2f+lI partial signatures on a message, a server combines the partial signatures
signatures into a threshold
signature on that message. The constructed signature is then verified using the site's public key (RSA verification).
verification).
If
If the signature verification
verification fails, then one or more partial signatures used in the combination were invalid,
invalid, in
which case the verification
verification proofs provided with the partial signatures are used to identify incorrect shares; the
corresponding servers are classified as malicious. The invalid shares serve as proof of corruption and can be
broadcast to all local servers.
servers. Further messages from the corrupted servers
servers are ignored.
Once the representative of the leading site receives an update from a client (either
(either local
local or forwarded by the

representative of a different site),
site), it assigns a sequence number to this update by creating a proposal message that
will then be sent to all other sites. The sequence number is assigned in agreement with other correct servers inside
the site,
site, masking the Byzantine behavior of malicious servers.
servers. The ASSIGN-SEQUENCE
ASSIGN-SEQUENCEintra-site protocol is used
for this purpose. The protocol consists of three rounds, the first two of which are similar to the corresponding
rounds of the BFT protocol: the site representative proposes an assignment by sending a pre-prepare message to
all servers within the site. Any server receiving the pre-prepare
pre-prepare message sends to all servers a prepare
prepare message as
acknowledgment that it accepts the representative's proposal. At the end of the second round, any server that has

prepare messages, in addition
received 2f prepare
addition to the pre-prepare, for the same view and sequence number, invokes
invokes the
THRESHOLD-SIGN
THRESHOLD-SIGN

intra-site protocol to generate a threshold signature on the representative's proposal.

ASSIGN-SEQUENCE protocol, the representative sends the proposal message for global
Upon completion of the ASSIGN-SEQUENCE

ordering on the wide area to the representatives of all other sites.
Each site's representative receiving the proposal message forwards it to the other servers inside the site,
site, and
invokes the THRESHOLD-SIGN protocol to generate an acknowledgment (accept) of the proposal. The representative
of the site then sends back the threshold signed accept message to the representatives of all other sites.
sites. Each

representative
represe~ltativewill forward
forward the accept
accepr message locally to all servers inside their site. A server within a site globally
orders the update when it receives accept messages from
from a majority
majority of sites.
sites.

B. View
Mew Changes
Changes
The above protocol describes the common-case
common-case operation of Steward. However,
However, several types of failure may
occur during system execution, such as the corruption of one or more site representatives, or the partitioning of the
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leader site.
site. Such
Such failures
failures require delicate handling to preserve both safety and liveness.
If the
the representative of a site is faulty,
faulty, the correct members of the site select a new representative by running
aa local
local view
view change
change protocol, after which progress can resume. The local view change algorithm preserves safety
across
across views,
views, even
even if consecutive representatives are malicious. Similarly, the leading site that coordinates the global
ordering
ordering between the wide area sites can be perceived as faulty if no global progress is made. In this case, a global
view change
change occurs.
occurs. View changes are triggered by timeouts, as described in Section IV-C
Each server maintains a local
local view number and a global view number. The local view number maps to the
of the wide
identifier of the server's current site representative, while the global view number maps to the identifier of
area
area leader site.
site. The local and global view change protocols update the server's corresponding view numbers.
We
We first
first introduce the CONSTRUCT-COLLECTIVE-STATE
CONSTRUCT-COLLECTIVE-STATE intra-site protocol, which is used as a building block in
both the
the local and
and global
global view change protocols.
of a site, as
The
The CONSTRUCT-COLLECTIVE-STATE
CONSTRUCT-COLLECTIVE-STATEprotocol generates a message describing the current state of
agreed by at least

ff + 11 correct servers
servers within the site.
site. The constructed

message is referred to as a union message.

The
The representative of a site
site invokes the protocol by sending a sequence number to all servers inside the site. Upon
receiving the
the invocation message, all
all servers send to the representative a message containing updates they have
ordered and/or acknowledged with a higher sequence number than the representative's number. The representative

+

computes
computes a union on the contents of 2f
2f + 1 of these messages, eliminating duplicates and using the latest update
of the union into a message
for
for aa given
given sequence
sequence number if conflicts exist. The representative packs the contents of
and
and sends
sends the
the message to all
all servers
servers in the site.
site. Upon receiving such a union message, each server updates its own

state with missing updates as
as needed, generates a partial signature on the message, and sends the signed message
state
to all
all servers
servers within the site.
site. A server then combines 2f
2f
to

+ 1 such
+

partial signatures into a single message that

represents the updates that the site ordered or acknowledged above the original sequence number.
represents

Local view change:
change: The local
local view change protocol is similar to the one described in [3]. It elects a new site
Local
and guarantees that correct servers cannot be made to violate previous safety constraints.
representative and
The protocol is
is invoked when a server at some site observes that global progress has not been made within a
The
is used at both the leading site
sire and non-leader sites. A server that suspects the representative
representative is
timeout period, and is
faulty increases its
its local
local view number and sends to all local servers a newrepresentative
faulty
new -representative message, which contains
the proposed view number.
number. Individual servers increase their proposed local view in a way similar to [3].
[3]. Upon
the

+

set of 2f + 11 newJepresentative
newgepresenrarive messages proposing the same view number (and, implicitly, a new
receiving a set
representative), the new representative computes the sequence number of the highest update ordered, such that all

updates with lower sequence
sequence numbers were ordered. We call this sequence number "ARU"
"ARU" (All Received Up-to).
The new representative then invokes
invokes the CONSTRUCT-COLLECTIVE-STATE
CONSTRUCT-COLLECTIVE-STATE protocol based on its ARU. Finally, the
The

-
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new representative invokes the ASSIGN-SEQUENCE
ASSIGN-SEQUENCE protocol to replay all pending updates that it learned from the
signed union message.

Global view change: In the global view change protocol, wide area sites exchange messages to elect a new
leading site if the current one is suspected to be faulty (partitioned away or with fewer than

21
2f +
+ 1 correct servers).

Each site runs an intra-site protocol, PROPOSE-LEADER-SITE,
PROPOSE-LEADER-SITE, to generate a threshold-signed message containing
the global view number that the site has agreed to propose.
The PROPOSE-LEADER-SITE
PROPOSE-LEADER-SITE protocol is invoked in a distributed fashion.
fashion. Upon suspecting that the leading site
is faulty,
faulty, a server within a site increases its global view number and generates a partial signature on a message
that proposes the new view.
view. Upon receiving

21
2f +
+ 11 partial

signatures for the same global view number, the local

representative combines the shares to construct the site's proposal. To ensure liveness, a server already suspects
the leading site,
site , and that receives

1f ++ 11 partial

signatures referring
refening to global view numbers higher than its own,

+

updates its global view number to the smallest value of the 1
f + 11 view numbers, and sends a corresponding partial
signature to the other servers in the site.
If enough servers in a site invoke the PROPOSELEADER-SITE protocol, the representative of that site will issue the
PROPOSE-LEADER-SITE

-.Site message that contains the identifier of that site and the proposed global
resultant threshold-signed newJeading
newleadingsite
view number. When the representativeof the new leading site receives a majority of such messages proposing
the same global view,
view, it starts a local reconciliation protocol by invoking the CONSTRUCT-COLLECTIVE-STATE
CONSTRUCT-COLLECTIVE-STATE
p1essage, below
protocol on its own ARU. We call the highest sequence of an ordered update in the resulting union message,

which all lower sequence numbers are ordered, "Site ARU". The representative of the new leading site invokes
the THRESHOLD-SIGN
THRESHOLD-SIGNprotocol on a message containing the Site ARU, and sends the resulting threshold-signed
message to the representatives of all other sites.
sites. Based on the Site ARU received, the representatives of the nonleader sites invoke
invoke the CONSTRUCT-COLLECTIVE-STATE
CONSTRUCT-COLLECTIVE-STATE protocol and send the resultant union message back to
the representative of the new leading site. A set of union messages from a majority of sites is used by servers in
the leading site to constrain the messages they will generate in the new view so that safety is preserved.

C. Timeouts

Steward relies on timeouts to detect problems with the representatives in different sites or with the leading site.
Our protocols do not assume synchronized clocks; however, we do assume that the rate of the clocks at different
servers is reasonably close. We believe that this assumption is valid considering today's technology. Below we

provide details about the timeouts in our protocol.

Local representative (Tl):
(TI): This timeout expires at a server of a non-leading site to replace the representative

+

once no (global) progress takes place for that period of time. Once the timeout expires at 1
f + 11 servers, the local

II

view change protocol takes place. Tl
TI should be higher than 3 times the wide area network round-trip to allow a
potential global view change protocol to complete without changing the local representative.
site representative (T2):
Leading sire
(T2): This timeout expires at a server at the leading site to replace the representative

once no (global) progress takes place for that period of time.
time. T2 should be large enough to allow the representative to
communicate with a majority of the sites. Specifically, since not all sites may be lined up with correct representatives
at the same time, T2 should be chosen such that each site can replace its representatives until a correct one will
site; the site needs to have a chance to replace f
communicate with the leading site;

+
+ 11 representatives within the T2

time period. Thus, we need that 1'2
7'2 >(f+2)*maxT1,
>(f+2)*maxTl, where maxT1
rnaxTl is an estimate of the largest Tl
T1 at any site.
site.

+

The (f
(f+ 2)
2) covers the possibility that when the leader site elects a representative,
representative, the Tl
TI timer is already running
at other sites.
sites.

Leading site (T3):
(T3): This timeout expires at a site to replace the leading site once no (global) progress takes place
for that period of time. Since we choose T2 to ensure a single communication round with every site, and since the
leading site needs at least 3 rounds to prove progress, in the worse case,
case, the leading site must have a chance to

+

elect 3 correct representatives to show progress, before being replaced. Thus, we need 1'3
T 3=
= (f
(f + 3)1'2.
3)T2.
Client timer (TO):
triggering it to inquire the status of its last update by
(TO): This timeout expires at the client, triggerins

interacting with various servers at the site. TO can have an arbitrary value.
Timeouts
Timeouts management:
managenzenr: Servers send their timers estimation (Tl,
(TI, T2)
T2) on global vIew
view change messages. The

site representative disseminates the ff

+
+ 1st
1st highest value (the value fQr
for which f higher or equal values exist) to

prevent the faulty servers from injecting wrong estimates. Potentially, timers can be exchanged as part of local
view change messages as well. The leading site representative chooses the maximum timer of all sites with which
tum determines T3).
communicates to determine T2 (which in turn
T3). Servers estimate the network round-trip according

to various interactions they have had. They can reduce the value if communication seems to improve.
V. CORRECTNESS

proof that our algorithm provides safety and liveness; the complete
In this section we provide a sketch of the proof

proof can be found in [12].
[ I 21.
Safety:

th update, then these
The safety property requires that if two correct servers execute the iith
updates

ASSIGN-SEQUENCE protocol and by the reconciliation
are identical.
identical. Intuitively, this property is preserved by the ASSIGN-SEQUENCE

mechanism implemented by the CONSTRUCT-COLLECTIVE-STATE
CONSTRUCT-COLLECTlVE-STATE protocol invoked after a view change (either local

+

or global). By requiring 2f + 11 servers to agree on any message within a site, the ASSIGN-SEQUENCE
ASSIGN-SEQUENCE protocol

+

+
compute the threshold signature for any message that leaves a site,
site, it ensures that any future
future set of 2f
2f + 1 servers
guarantees that at least ff + 11 correct servers assented to the proposed sequence number. By using 2f + 11 shares to

will contain at least one correct server that assented to the proposal. This guarantees that the site will not "forget"
"forget"

12

that it acknowledged the
requiring
the proposal should a view change occur, preventing a conflict to happen. Finally, by requiring
aa majority of site
intersection will
site acknowledgments to globally order an update, the protocol guarantees that any intersection
contain a site
site from
from the
the previous majority.
majority.
Liveness:
Liveness: To
To guarantee
guarantee liveness, Steward must ensure that servers move to a new local or global view when no
progress takes place.
place. By requiring a set of 2f
2f

+ 11 servers to

initiate a local view change, the local view change

protocol guarantees that faulty
faulty replicas cannot create instability and prevent progress in the system by forcing
frequent
frequent local
local view changes.
changes. The representative can cause view changes by malicious actions, but then a different
representative will replace it. Since
Since there are at most ff faulty replicas in a site, after at most ff

+ 1 local view

changes
changes it is
is guaranteed that the site will have a correct representative.

+

In
In addition,
addition, by requiring a set of 2f
2 f + 11 servers to initiate a proposal for a global view change, the global view
change algorithm prevents a malicious server from causing frequent global view changes.
of timeout values, as
A
management of
A critical component that guarantees global liveness is the selection and management
described in Section
Section IV-C.
IV-C. The timeout values guarantee that the correct representative at the leading site has
enough time
time to
to communicate with a correct representative at each site before it is replaced. Note that this requires
that the
the correct representative
representative at the leading site will need to stay valid long enough to allow up to ff

+ 1 complete

view
view changes
changes to
to occur in non-leading sites.
sites.

VI. PERFORMANCE
EVALUATION
PERFORMANCE
EVALUATION

To evaluate the performance of our hierarchical Byzantine replication architecture, we implemented a complete
To
prototype of our protocol including all the necessary communication and cryptographic functionality. In this paper
prototype
we focus
focus only
only on the networking and cryptographic aspects of our protocols, and do not consider disk writes.
we

Testbed and Network Setup:
Setup: We selected a network topology consisting of
Testbed
of 5 wide area sites, assuming that
faults in each site,
site, in order to quantify the performance of
there can
can be at
at most 5 Byzantine faults
of our system in a realistic
there
16 replicated servers in each site.
site.
scenario. This
This requires 16
scenario.
architecture uses RSA threshold signatures
signatures [6]
[6] to represent an entire site within a single trusted message sent
Our architecture
on the wide area
area network,
network, thus trading computational power for wide area bandwidth and latency, in the number of
on
of
area crossings.
crossings. We believe this tradeoff is realistic considering the current technology trend: end-to-end wide
wide area
area bandwidth is
is slow to improve,
improve, while latency reduction of wide area links is limited by the speed of
of light.
area
consists of a cluster with twenty 3.2GHz Intel Xeon computers, all of
Our experimental
experimental testbed consists
of them having
64-bit architecture.
architecture. On these computers, a 1024
1024 bit RSA signature can be computed in 1.3
1.3 msec and can be
aa 64-bit
verified in 0.07
0.07 msec.
msec. The leader site was deployed on 16
16 of the machines, and the other 4 sites were emulated by
verified
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one computer each
I. The emulating computers were seen from
each1.
from the other sites as if they were the representatives
representatives
of complete 16
16 server sites, for a system consisting of a total of 80 nodes spread over 5 sites.
sites. Upon receiving a
packet at a non-leader site,
site, the emulating computers were busy-waiting for the amount of time it took a 16
16 server
site to handle that packet and reply to it, including both in-site communication
communication and the necessary computation.
The busy-waiting times for each type of packet were determined in advance
advance by benchmarking individual
individual protocols
on a fully
fully deployed, 16
16 server site.
site. We used the Spines [13]
[I31 messaging system to emulate latency and throughput
constraints on the wide area links.
links.
We compared the performance results of the above system with those obtained by BFT [3]
[3] on the same network
setup with five
five sites,
sites, run on the same cluster,
cluster, only that instead of using 16
16 servers in
i n each site,
site, for BFT we used a
total of 16
16 servers across the entire network.
network. This allows for up to 5 Byzantine failures
failures in the entire network for
BFT, instead of up to 5 Byzantine failures
failures in each site for Steward;
Steward; however, since BFT is a flat solution where
there is no correlation between faults
faults and the sites where they can occur,
occur, we believe this comparison is fair and
conservative. We distributed the BFT servers such that four sites contain 3 servers
servers each, and one site contains 4
servers. All the write updates and read-only queries in our experiments carried
canied a payload of 200 bytes, representing
a common SQL statement.
Bandwidth Limitation: We first investigate
investigate the benefits of the hierarchical
hierarchical architecture
architecture in a symmetric configuration with 5 sites, where all sites
sites are connected to each other with 50 milliseconds
milliseconds latency links.
links. A 50 millisecond
delay emulates the wide area crossing of the continental
continental US.
US.
In the first
first experiment, clients inject write updates. Figure I1 shows
shows the update throughput when increasing the
number of clients, limiting the capacity of wide area links between the sites to 10,
10, 5 and 2.5Mbps, both for Steward
and BFT.
BFT. The graph shows that up to 2.5Mbps, Steward is not limited by bandwidth. The system is able to process
a total of about 84 updates/sec, being limited only by CPU, used for computing threshold signatures at the sites.
lOur
lour implementation was tested on a complete deployment where each site is composed on multiple computers using the complete set
of protocols and is currently undergoing a 5-sites DARPA red-team exercise. In order to evaluate Steward's scalability on large networks
supporting many faults
faults at each site, we used emulating computers for non-leader sites to limit the deployment to our cluster of 20 machines.
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Update Mix Throughput -- 10
10 Clients
Clients

Fig. 4.

Update Mix Latency - 10 Clients

As
As we
we increase
increase the number of clients, the BFT throughput increases at a lower slope than Steward, mainly due
to
updates/sec, being
to the
the one
one additional wide area crossing for each update. At 10
10 Mbps, BFT achieves about 58 updateslsec,
of 26 updatestsec,
updates/sec, and at 2.5
limited by the available bandwidth. Similarly, at 5 Mbps it can sustain a maximum of
Mbps
of BFT as the number of
of
updateslsec. We also notice a reduction in the throughput of
Mbps a maximum of about 6 updates/sec.
clients increases.
of a wide
increases. We believe this is due to a cascading increase of message loss, generated by the lack of
area flow
flow control in the original implementation of BFT. Such a flow
flow control was not needed as BFT was designed
to
LANs. For the same
same reason, we were not able to run BFT with more than 24 clients at 5 Mbps, and 15
to work in LANs.
performance of
of BFT to
clients
2.5Mbps. We believe that adding a client queuing mechanism would stabilize the performance
clients at
at 2.5Mbps.
its
its maximum achieved throughput,
throughput, regardless of the number of clients.
The
The average
average update latency,
latency, as depicted in Figure 2, shows Steward achieving almost constant latency. The latency

slightly increases with the addition of clients, reaching 190
190 ms when 15
15 clients send updates into the system. At this
slightly
of clients in the system.
point,
point, as
as client updates start to be queued, their latency increases linearly with the number of

BFT exhibits
exhibits a similar behavior at 10
10 Mbps, only that its update latency is affected by the additional number of
BFT
of
messages sent and the additional wide area crossing, such that for 15
15 clients the average update latency is 336 ms.
messages
As the
the bandwidth decreases, the update latency increases heavily, reaching up to 600 ms at 5 Mbps and 5 seconds
As
at 2.5
2.5 Mbps,
Mbps, for
for 15
15 clients.
clients.
at

Queries: One of the benefits of our hierarchical architecture is that read-only
Adding Read-only Queries:
read-only queries can
site. To demonstrate these benefits we conducted an experiment where 10 clients send
be answered locally, at each site.
queries and write updates, chosen randomly at each client, with different ratios. We compared
mixes of read-only queries
the performance of Steward and BFT when both systems are not limited by bandwidth constraints. We used links
the
50 ms,
ms, 10
10 Mbps between the sites.
sites. Figures 3 and 4 show the average throughput and latency, respectively, of
of 50
of
different mixes of queries and updates sent using Steward and BFT. When clients send only read queries, Steward

achieves about 2.9 ms per query, with a throughput of over 3,400 queries per second. This is because all the queries
achieves
are answered
answered locally,
locally, their latency being dominated by two RSA signature operations: one at the originating client,
are

15

,,

100

....*- -Sto.:'wanl
.....•....
SIC
BFf~
BFT
-r-

90

t

!
Ie
;':

~
:5

S[L'W:lf(J •.•.. + ....
BFf~

....................

80

:woo

,.

70

":t"

60
50

.. .... "'

.,....

..

~.,

..,..-

.... ..,.

-, .

...

40

,.,.,

30

.....

1500

~
..J

,

u

-g,

'

1000

::0

.~.,

20

500

;+:,-

.'

10

..... +

.,/

o
o

~ '-~~----'
10

15

20

25

+

+ .•..•..•

o

~()

15

10

20

25

30

cticnl~

Clients

Fig. 5.
5 . Wide Area Network Emulation - Write Update Throughput

J

(J

Fig. 6.
6.

Wide Area Network Emulation
Emula1ion - Write Update Latency

and one at the servers answering the query.
query.
For BFT, the latency of read-only queries is about 105
105 ms, and the total throughput achieved is 95 queries per
second. This is expected, as read-only queries in BFT need to be answered by at least f

+ 11 servers,
servers, some of which

being located across wide area links.
links. BFT could have achieved queries locally in a site if we deployed it such that

+

2 f + 11 servers in each site (in order to guarantee liveness it needs f
there are at least 2f

+ 11 correct servers to answer

queries in each site). Such a deployment, for J
f == 5 faults and 5 sites, would need at least 55 servers total, which
will dramatically increase communication for updates, and further reduce BFT's performance.
As the percentage of write updates in the query mix increases, the average latency for both Steward and BFT
increases linearly, with Steward latency being about 100
100 ms lower than BFT at all times. This is a substantial
improvement considering the absolute value of the update latency, the ratio between the latency achieved by the

two systems ranging from a factor of two, when only write updates are served, to a factor of 30,
30, when only read
queries are served.
served. The throughput drops with the increase of update latency, such that at 100%
100% write updates there
is only about a factor of two between the throughput achieved by Steward and BFT.

Wide Area Scalability:
Scalability: To demonstrate the scalability of the hierarchical architecture we conducted an experiment that emulated a wide area network that covers several continents.
continents. We selected five sites on the Planetlab
network [14], measured the latency and available bandwidth characteristics between every pair of sites, and emulated
the network topology on our cluster in order to run Steward and BFT. We ran the experiment on our cluster,
cluster, and
not directly on Planetlab because Planetlab machines are not of 64-bit architecture. Moreover, Planetlab computers

provide a shared environment where multiple researchers run experiments at the same time, bringing the load on
almost all the machines to more than 100%
100% at all times. Such an environment lacks the computational power
required for the two systems tested, and would artificially influence our experimental results.
The five sites we emulated in our tests are located in the US (University of Washington), Brazil (Rio Grande do
SuI),
Sul), Sweden (Swedish Institute of Computer Science),
Science), Korea (KAIST) and Australia (Monash University). The
network latency varied between 59 ms (US - Korea) and 289 ms (Brazil - Korea). Available bandwidth varied
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Latency
CAIRN Network

between 405
405 Kbps(Brazil
Kbps(Brazi1 - Korea)
Korea) and 1.3Mbps
1.3Mbps (US - Australia).
of clients in the system, while
Figure 5 shows
shows the
the average
average write
write update throughput as we increased the number of
Figure
Figure 6 shows
shows the average
average update latency.
latency. As seen in Figures 5 and 6, Steward is able to achieve its maximum
limit of about 84
84 updates/second
updateslsecond when 27 clients inject updates into the system. The latency increases from about
200
200 ms
ms for
for I1 client,
client, to about 360 ms for 30 clients.
clients.
updates/sec, while the update latency starts
BFT is
is limited by the available
available bandwidth to a maximum of about 9 updateslsec,
at
at 63]
631 ms
ms for
for one
one client, and jumps to the order of seconds when more than 6 clients are introduced.
Comparison
Comparison with Non-Byzantine
Non-Byzantine Protocols:
Protocols:

Since Steward deploys a lightweight fault-tolerant protocol

between the wide area sites,
sites, we expect it to achieve performance comparable to existing non-Byzantine faultpaying
tolerant protocols commonly used in database replication systems, but with Byzantine guarantees (while paying
more hardware).
hardware).

In the
the following experiment we compare the performance of our hierarchical Byzantine architecture with that
In
of two-phase commit protocols.
5] we evaluated the performance of
of two-phase commit protocols [I61
[16] using
protocols. In []
1151
of the CAIRN
CAlRN network
aa wide
wide area network setup
setup across the US, called CAlRN
CAIRN [17].
[17]. We emulated the topology of

the Spines
Spines messaging system,
system, and ran Steward and BFT on top of it. The main characteristic
characteristic of
of the CAIRN
using the
is that East and
and West Coast sites were connected through a single link of
of 38ms and 1.86Mbps.
topology is
and 8 show
show the average throughput and latency of write updates, respectively, of
of Steward and BFT
Figures 7 and
on the
the CAIRN network topology.
topology. Steward was able to achieve about 51
5] updateslsec
updates/sec in our tests, being limited
on
mainly by the bandwidth of the link between the East and West Coasts in CAIRN. In comparison, an upper
upper bound
[I51
of two-phase commit protocols presented in []
5] was able to achieve 76 updateslsec.
updates/sec. As our architecture uses a
non-Byzantine fault-tolerant protocol between the sites, it was expected to achieve comparable results with two

phase commit protocols.
protocols. We believe that the difference in performance is caused by the presence of
of additional
phase
signatures in the
the message headers of Steward, adding ]128
28 bytes to the 200 byte payload of
of each update.
digital signatures
The high bandwidth requirement of BFT causes it to achieve a very low throughput and high latency on the
The
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CAIRN network. The maximum throughput achieved by BFT was 2.7
updates/sec and the update latency was over
2.7 updateslsec
a second, except when a single client injected updates in the entire system.

Summary: The performance results we presented show that our hierarchical Byzantine architecture achieves
achieves

performance comparable (though somewhat lower) to non-Byzantine protocols when run on wide area networks
with multiple sites, and is able to scale to networks that span across several
several continents. In addition, our experiments
show that the ability of our architecture to answer queries locally inside a site gives
gives substantial performance
improvements beyond the qualitative benefit of allowing read-only queries in the presence of partitions. In contrast,
flat Byzantine protocols, while performing very well on local area networks, do not scale well to multiple sites
across a wide area network. They have high bandwidth requirements, and use additional rounds of communication
that increase individual update latency and reduce their total achievable throughput.

VII. RELATED
WORK
RELATED
WORK

Agreement and Consensus:
Agreernenr
Consensus: At the core of many replication protocols is a more general problem, known as the
agreement or consensus problem. There are several
several models that researchers considered when solving consensus,
consensus,
manner. Other
the strongest one being the Byzantine model in which a participant can behave in an arbitrary manner.

than the behavior of a participant (malicious or not), other relevant considerations are whether communication is
asynchronous or synchronous, whether authentication is available or not, and whether the participants communicate
over a flat network or not. A good overview of significant results is presented in [18].
[18]. Optimal results state that under

the assumption that communication is not authenticated and nodes are directly connected,
connected, in order to tolerate ]f

+

+

Byzantine failures,
failures, 3]
3f + 1 participants and]
and f + 11 communication rounds are required. If authentication is available,
available,

then ]f

+ 11 rounds

are still required, but the number of participants just
just has to be greater than ]f

+ 11 [19].
[19]. An

important factor that must be taken into consideration is whether participants are directly connected or not. In [20],
[20],

Dolev shows that in an arbitrary connected network, if ]f Byzantine faults must be tolerated and the network is

]f + 11 (2]
(2f + 1 if no

signature exists) connected, then agreement can be achieved
achieved in 2]
2f

+ 1 rounds.

Byzantine Group Communication:
Communicarion: Related with our work are group communication systems resilient to Byzantine
failures. The most well-known such systems are Rampart [21]
[21] and SecureRing [22].
[22]. Although these systems are
extremely robust, they have a severe performance cost and require a large number of un-attacked nodes to maintain

their guarantees. Both systems rely on failure
failure detectors to determine which replicas are faulty.
faulty. An attacker can
exploit this to slow correct replicas or the communication between them until enough are excluded from the group.
group.

ITUA [23],
[23], [24],
[24], [25],
[25], [26].
[26]. The ITVA
ITUA system,
system,
Another intrusion-tolerant group communication system is ITVA
UIUC, focuses on providing intrusion tolerant group services. The approach taken considers
developed by BBN and DIVe,
all participants as equal and is able to tolerate up to less than a third of malicious participants.
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Replication
Replicarion with
with Benign Faults:
Faults: The two-phase commit (2PC) protocol [16]
[I 61 provides serializability in a distributed
database
database system when transactions may span several
several sites. It is commonly used to synchronize transactions in a
of 2PC, paying the
replicated
replicated database.
database. Three-phase
Three-phase commit [Ske82]
[Ske82] overcomes some of the availability problems of
latency. Paxos [I]
[1] is a very robust algorithm
price of an
an additional communication round, and therefore, additional latency.
for
for benign
benign fault-tolerant replication. Paxos uses two rounds of messages in the common case to assign a total order
to
to updates
updates and
and requires 2f
2f

+ 11 replicas in order to tolerate ff

faults.
faults.

Quorum
Quorurlz Systems
Systerns with Byzantine Fault-Tolerance: Quorum systems obtain Byzantine fault-tolerance by applying
quorum replication methods. Examples of such systems include Phalanx [27], [28]
[28] and its successor Fleet [29], [30].
Fleet provides a distributed
distributed repository for Java objects.
objects. It relies on an object replication mechanism that tolerates
Byzantine failures
failures of servers,
servers, while supporting benign clients. Although the approach is relatively scalable with the
number of replica servers,
servers, it suffers from
from the drawbacks of flat non-hierarchical Byzantine replication solutions.
Replication with Byzantine
The first practical work to solve replication while withstanding
Byzanrirze Fault-Tolerance:
Fa~~lr-Tolerance:

+

Byzantine failures
failures is
is the work of Castro and Liskov [3].
[3]. Their algorithm requires 33f
f + 1 replicas in order to tolerate
ff faults.
faults. In addition,
addition, the client has to wait for ff
waiting
waiting for
for up
up to
to 2f

+ 11 identical answers (which, for liveness guarantees may require

+
+ 11 answers)
answers) in order to make sure that a correct answer is received. The algorithm obtains

very
a]. [31]
[31] propose an improvement for the Castro and Liskov
very good
good performance on local
local area networks.
networks. Yin et al.
approach
approach by separating the agreement component that orders requests from the execution component that processes
requests.
requests. The
The separation allows
allows utilization of the same agreement component for many different replication tasks.
It
It also
also reduce the number of processing storage replicas to 2f

+ 1.I. Martin and

[32] recently introduced an
Alvisi [32]

algorithm that is
is able to achieve Byzantine consensus in only two rounds, while using 5f
algorithm

+

overcome f faults.
faults. This approach trades lower availability (4f
(4f + 1
out of 55f
f
lout
overcome
instead of 2f
instead

+ lout
1 out of 3f +
+ 11 in
+

+ 1 servers in order to

+ 11 connected replicas are required,

BFT), for increased performance. The solution seems very appealing for local

networks that provide high connectivity between the replicas. We considered using it within the sites in our
area networks
to reduce the number of intra-site communication rounds. However, as we make use of
of threshold
architecture to
signatures inside a site,
site, the overhead of combining larger signatures of 4f
signatures

+ 11 shares would greatly overcome the

benefits of using one
one less communication round within the site.
benefits

architectures: An alternate hierarchical approach to scale Byzantine replication to wide area networks
Alternate architectures:
can be based on having a few
few trusted nodes that are assumed to be working under a weaker adversary model.
can
example, these
these trusted nodes may exhibit crashes and recoveries but not penetrations. A Byzantine replication
For example,
algorithm in such
such an environment can use this knowledge in order to optimize the performance and bring it closer
algorithm
to the
the performance of a fault-tolerant,
fault-tolerant, non-Byzantine solution.
to
Such aa hybrid
hybrid approach was proposed in [33],
[33], [34]
[34] by Verissimo
Such
Verissimo et al,
aI, where trusted nodes were also assumed
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to
of [33]
[33] inspired
to perfonn
perform synchronously, providing strong global timing guarantees. The hybrid failure model of
the
the Survivable
Survivable Spread [35]
[35] work,
work, where a few trusted nodes (at least one per site) are assumed impenetrable, but
are
are not synchronous,
synchronous, may crash and recover,
recover, and may experience network partitions and merges. These trusted
nodes
nodes were
were implemented by Boeing Secure Network Server (SNS) boxes, which are limited computers designed
specifically
specifically not to
to be penetrable.
In
In our opinion,
opinion, both the hybrid approach proposed in [34],
[34], and the approach proposed in this paper seem viable to
practically scale
scale Byzantine replication
replication to wide area networks. The hybrid approach makes stronger assumptions while
our approach
approach pays more hardware and computational costs. Further developing both approaches and contrasting
them
them can
can be a fertile
fertile ground for
for future
future research.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS
CONCLUSIONS
This
of Byzantine replication to systems
This paper presented a hierarchical architecture that enables efficient scaling of
that
that span
span multiple wide area sites,
sites, each consisting of several potentially malicious replicas. The architecture reduces
By confining the effect of
of
the
the message
messase complexity on wide
wide area updates,
updates, increasing the system's ability to scale. B'y
any
any malicious replica to its
its local
local site,
site, the architecture enables the use of a benign fault-tolerant algorithm over the
wide
perfonnance is achieved by
wide area
area network,
network, increasing system availability.
availability. Further increase in availability and performance
the
the ability
ability to
to process read-only queries within a site.
site.
We
perfonnance
We implemented Steward,
Steward, a fully
fully functional prototype that realizes our architecture, and evaluated its performance

over several
several network
network topologies. The experimental results show considerable improvement over flat Byzantine
over
replication
replication algorithms,
algorithms, bringing the perfonnance
performance of Byzantine replication closer to existing benign fault-tolerant
replication techniques over wide area networks.
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